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Do Defaults on Payday Loans Matter?
Ronald Mann
Columbia Law School⇤
December 1, 2014
This essay examines the effect on a borrower’s financial health of failure to
repay a payday loan. Recent regulatory initiatives suggest an inclination to
add an “ability to pay” requirement to payday-loan underwriting that would
be fundamentally inconsistent with the nature of the product. Because the
premise of that regulation would be that borrowers suffer harm when they
fail to repay such a loan, it is timely to examine the after-effects of such a
default empirically. This essay examines that question using a dataset that
combines payday borrowing histories with credit bureau information.
The essay uses a difference-in-difference approach, comparing the credit-
score change over time of those who default to the credit score change over the
same period of those who do not default. The essay presents three principal
findings. First, credit score changes for borrowers who default on payday
loans differ immaterially from changes for borrowers who do not default on
⇤435 W. 116th; New York, NY 10027; rmann@law.columbia.edu
payday loans. Second, the fall in the year of the default plainly overstates
the net effect of the default, because the credit scores of those who default on
payday loans experience disproportionately large increases for at least two
years after the year of the default. Third, the payday loan default cannot
be regarded as the cause of the borrower’s financial distress; borrowers who
default on payday loans have experienced disproportionately large drops in
their credit scores for at least two years before their default.
KEYWORDS: Consumer finance; payday lending; financial health; credit
scores
JEL: D1, K35
Do Defaults on Payday Loans Matter?
1 Introduction
Payday lending is at the heart of debates about “alternative” financial prod-
ucts. Since its rise in the early 1990’s, the product has gained widespread
traction with consumers. In the typical transaction, an individual borrows
$200-$500 and commits to repay the borrowed funds, together with a one-
time fee of 12-18% of the loan’s principal, out of the individual’s next pay-
check. Mann and Hawkins 2006. Payday loans are now available at about
20,000 storefront locations throughout the Nation, where more than ten mil-
lion Americans borrowed money in 2010. Pew Project 2012. To put their
success in context, there are more payday lender locations in this country
than there are Starbucks and McDonald’s locations combined. Morgan et al.
2012.
Concerns about payday lending come from its role in the development
of “fringe” lending, which has played a major part in the oft-chronicled rise
of modern America’s culture of indebtedness. Caskey 1996; Marron 2009;
Mayer 2010; Graeber 2011; Hyman 2012. With a vehemence surprising for
a product so successful with consumers, consumer advocates are almost uni-
formly critical of the product. Johnson 2012; Martin and Schwartz 2012;
Peterson 2004.
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Several attributes of the product have attracted attention. The most ob-
vious is the relatively high interest rates characteristic of the product, which
typically are in the range of 400% (a fixed fee of about 15% for a loan of two
weeks or less).1 To supporters of usury limits on consumer lending, a product
with interest rates in the range of 400% is necessarily problematic. Criticisms
on that point led, for example, to 2007 legislation2 prohibiting loans to mili-
tary personnel and their families at interest rates above 36%; this essentially
terminated payday lending to military families. Johnson 2012; Aul 2008.
State regulators frequently have responded by limiting the prices payday
lenders can charge for their products. Although some of those limits are so
strict as to make the product impracticable, for the most part they permit
lending at the rates summarized above.3 Further rate regulation at the fed-
eral level seems less likely, however, largely because usury considerations are
explicitly off the table as the basis for regulation by the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (the “CFPB”).4
Another oft-noted concern relates to persistent use of the product. It is
1Mann and Hawkins 2006. The relatively high nominal interest rate reflects the cost
structure of the industry. On the one hand, operating costs do not decline proportionately
with the size of the loan; thus, the administrative costs for small loans are quite high
when measured on a percentage basis. At the same time, because the loans are effectively
unsecured and typically made with relatively little inquiry into creditworthiness, losses are
not insubstantial. Lawrence and Elliehausen 2008. For a detailed numerical analysis of the
operating expenses and losses of payday lenders and how those compare to fee revenues,
see Elliehausen 2009.
2The Talent-Nelson Amendment, Section 670 of the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364, 120 Stat. 2083, was codified
at 49 U.S.C. § 987.
3National Conference of State Legislatures 2013; Pew Project 2012; Morgan et al. 2012.
412 U.S.C. § 5517(o).
2
well-known that many borrowers use the product frequently; in the common
phrasing they are said to “roll over” the loans from pay period to pay period
because they lack the funds to pay them off as they come due. This leads
consumer advocates to fear that borrowers frequently become “mired” in debt
that they could have avoided had they never used the product. Mayer 2010;
Peterson 2004; White 2009. The specific concern is that excessive optimism
causes users to believe they will pay off their loans rapidly, when in fact they
usually will not. Bar-Gill and Warren 2008, 44-46. Indeed, Bar-Gill and
Warren go so far as to assert that no rational consumer expecting to roll over
the loan would agree to the terms of a payday loan.5
Responding to that concern, many states have adopted specific limitations
on rollovers. Mann and Hawkins 2006, 897-98. This concern has been partic-
ularly noteworthy at the federal level, where the CFPB’s director has publicly
suggested Cordray 2013 the propriety of CFPB action against products for
which “a substantial percentage of users rol[l] over their debts on a recurring
basis” because those products amount to “debt traps.” On that score, a 2013
CFPB white paper on payday loans directly decries the repetitive use of the
product and avows an intention to consider mandating cooling-off periods
as a matter of federal law. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 2013.
Similar action by the Comptroller of the Currency and Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation against the deposit advance product banks commonly
offered presages prompt attention by the CFPB. Federal Deposit Insurance
5Alan White’s analysis is similar. White 2009, 159-63.
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Corporation 2013; Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 2013.
A third concern relates to the underwriting of the product. Because the
premise of the product is that it is available with relatively little investment
of underwriting resources by the lender, the product has a higher rate of
default than many other consumer financial products. As mentioned above,
the loans are extended in the ordinary course minutes after the borrower
enters the retail location. To be sure, sophisticated providers can pack quite
a bit of risk analysis into those few minutes. Interviews with industry risk
managers suggest that the large national providers take the information from
the borrower and use it in real-time to develop a risk score reflecting the
borrower’s likelihood of default; whether the assessment is performed in-
house using proprietary software (increasingly the case) or using a third-party
provider, in either case the lender will have a good idea of (for example) the
customer’s past repayment history on payday loans and similar products.6
Turning to that aspect of the product, the CFPB’s recent “Data Point” notes
that about 20% of all borrowers from a payday lender will default in a single
year.7
The relatively high default rate raises yet another regulatory possibility
6Although the large payday lenders do not, so far as I can ascertain, share informa-
tion with the major credit bureaus, they do share that information with niche bureaus
specializing in alternative lending; electronic access to that information in real time is
routine.
7The rate of default on a per-loan basis is considerably lower, in the range of 5%. But
because many borrowers avoid default by obtaining a new loan (rather than repaying the
loan from independent sources of repayment), the CFPB’s approach counts the rate of
default on a per-borrower per-year basis.
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- intervention focused on the borrower’s ability to repay the loan. Require-
ments that a lender consider the borrower’s “ability to pay” have been com-
mon in other countries for many years, but only recently have they come to
the forefront in the United States. Pottow 2011. Most obviously, Dodd-Frank
imposed an “ability to pay” requirement on home mortgage lenders,8 and the
Credit CARD Act imposed such a requirement on credit card issuers.9
Although the harms from a mortgage foreclosure or the loss of access
to credit cards are considerably more pressing and immediate than the col-
lection efforts of a payday lender, the CFPB’s focus on payday lenders ap-
parently has caused the CFPB to consider regulatory action against payday
lenders based on a failure to give due consideration to a borrower’s “ability
to pay.” To get a sense for how impractical such a requirement would be in
the streamlined payday lending process, consider the items to which Dodd-
Frank requires that mortgage lenders attend: “the consumer’s credit history,
current income, expected income the consumer is reasonably assured of re-
ceiving, current obligations, debt-to-income ratio * * * , employment status,
and other financial resources.”10 Indeed, although the agency has not yet
instituted a formal rulemaking, it has begun taking enforcement actions on
that basis. Most prominently, in a recent action against ACE Cash Express,
the CFPB based its action in part on the allegation that ACE persistently
8Dodd-Frank § 1411(b) (codified as Truth in Lending Act § 129C, 15 U.S.C. § 1639c).
9Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 § 109 (codified
as 15 U.S.C. 1655e).
1015 U.S.C. § 1639c(3).
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made loans to borrowers even when it knew that they had no ability to repay
them. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 2014.
Turning to that question, the purpose of this essay is to examine the
consequences on borrower financial health of a default on a payday loan. If
the justification for regulatory emphasis on ability to pay is the harm that
ensues when borrowers receive loans they cannot repay, then the empirical
foundation of any such regulation must be the significance of that harm. My
previous writing on the subject has suggested that one of the favorable at-
tributes of payday loans, at least as compared to consumer financial products
like credit cards, is that the relatively low balances indicate that the products
will not cause serious financial harm even if the loans do go unpaid. Mann
and Hawkins 2006. That discussion, however, was purely speculative, with
no basis in data. The agency’s contrary intuition, coupled with the unique
opportunity to examine a dataset matching the existence of payday loan de-
faults to a history of consumer credit scores, motivated me to examine the
question empirically.
Section 2 of the essay situates this project against the existing literature
on the role of payday lending in financial distress. Section 3 describes the
unique dataset that made this essay possible. Section 4 describes the empir-
ical methods and results. Section 5 briefly elucidates the implications of the
empirical results for the the continuing policy debates about payday lending
regulation.
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2 Literature Review
The role of payday loans in the overall health of a consumer’s financial po-
sition has received considerable attention. Most commonly, the literature
questions whether borrowers are rationally selecting the payday loan prod-
uct, or instead are choosing it because of a behavioral or psychological error
that leads them to misunderstand the product and the likelihood that they
will be able to repay the loan. In that vein, e.g., Bar-Gill and Warren (2008)
and White (2009) suggest that substantially all payday-loan borrowing rests
on a misguided assumption that the borrowers will be able to repay the
loans. By contrast, the empirical data on the question suggest that bor-
rower predictions of payday loan usage are relatively accurate. Mann 2013;
Levy and Sledge 2012; Harris Poll 2013. Zinman (forthcoming 2015) pro-
vides a useful summary of that literature, concluding that on balance the
“most striking finding” is that forecasts of repayment tend to be unbiased on
average: although they often are wrong, the errors are neither systematically
optimistic (payment later than expected) nor pessimistic (payment earlier
than expected).
A harder problem is to put the payday loan in the dynamic context of
the arc of a consumer’s financial distress, to understand where payday loans
fit in along that continuum. Two intertwined questions are pertinent. First,
are payday loans the source of distress or a tool to which borrowers turn
because of distress? Second, does the use of the payday loan have a positive
7
or negative effect on the path of distress?
On those questions, about which this paper is written, the literature is
much more sketchy. Using an extensive dataset that allows them to match
individual borrowings on credit cards and payday loans, Skiba and Tobacman
(2009) show a considerable deterioration in liquidity both before and after
the first payday loan. In the same vein, Campbell et al. (2012) conclude that
access to payday loans correlates with involuntary bank account closures.
Neither of those papers, however, examines how creditworthiness might
change during the period after a default to the payday lender. Probably the
most substantial discussion on this point in the existing literature focuses on
the small size of the payday loan. Mann and Hawkins (2006) reason that
payday loans might be preferable to credit cards because the comparatively
small loan amounts mean that the consequences of a default to the payday
lender will be (relatively) slight. More expansively, Hawkins (2011, 1395-
99) situates the constrained size of the payday loan in a general discussion
of the relation between fringe banking and financial distress. In his view,
the constrained size of the payday loan is central to ensuring that it not
contribute to “excessive debt burden” or ensuing “financial distress.” Neither
of those papers, however, has any empirical data to test the “too small to
hurt” hypothesis.
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3 Data
The data analyzed in this essay combine two distinct sources: data from
payday lenders about the borrower’s loan activity (including defaults) and
data from a credit reporting agency about the borrower’s credit attributes
over time. The unique merger of those data allows this essay to make a
distinct combination to the existing literature.
On the first point, three large national payday lenders provided the bor-
rowing data, which include electronic borrower histories for a total of 37,655
individual borrowers. The histories cover the retail outlets of those lenders
located in seven states (California, Florida, Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma,
Texas, and Utah). The data cover all borrowers who started borrowing se-
quences in the first half of 2006 or 2008 after a 90-day period without borrow-
ing. For each borrower, the lender data include (among other things) date
of birth, borrower income, the dates on which the loans originated and were
repaid, and an indicator of default for any loan that the borrower failed to
repay. It warrants noting that the lenders that submitted data for use in the
study are all members of the Community Financial Services Association of
America (CFSA), a trade association of storefront lenders. CFSA members
follow a self-regulatory set of “Best Practices,” which include limitations on
rollovers and require the availability of low-cost extended repayment options
to troubled debtors. It is likely that compliance with these practices causes
the behavior of their borrowers to differ in some respects from those in the
9
marketplace as a whole.
Trans Union LLC merged the lender data with data from its records, using
the borrowers’ Social Security numbers. The merger added credit attribute
files from Trans Union LLC for four points in time: January of 2006 and
January of 2007 for borrowers who had qualifying loans in 2006; January of
2008 and January of 2009 for borrowers who had qualifying loans in 2008.
the date one year after that borrowing, the date of the first loan in the 2008
period, and the date one year after that borrowing. For the 29,533 borrowers
who had qualifying loans in both 2006 and 2008, there are four credit-score
data points; for those with a qualifying loan in only one of the two years of
interest, there are two credit-score data points. Before returning the merged
file, Trans Union anonymized the file (by substituting a unique identifier for
each Social Security Number) and returned it to the investigator.11
Among other things, the data that Trans Union added include the propri-
etary VantageScore®. Developed by the three major credit bureaus (Trans
Union, Equifax and Experian), its purpose is to identify loan applicants likely
to become 90 or more days delinquent within a 24-month period. The Van-
tageScore ranges from a low of 501 to a high of 990. The computation of
the score is based on six general factors of a consumer’s credit report, in-
cluding payment history, line utilization, balances, depth of credit, recent
credit, and available credit. One advantage of using the VantageScore over
11I have not had access to the original file that included Social Security numbers, but
only the merged file.
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the mainstream FICO® score is that the VantageScore tends to score more
consumers with “thin” credit files because it has lower scoring restrictions
than the FICO score. Specifically, where a FICO score requires at least six
months of credit history, the VantageScore requires only one month of credit
history.
4 Analysis
4.1 Linking Default and Creditworthiness
The question of interest is how a payday loan default affects the borrower’s
financial health. Because this dataset includes a series of credit scores for each
borrower, it is at least theoretically possible to analyze the relation between
a default at one point in time and the borrower’s financial health at a later
time. I follow Agarwal et al. (2006) and Zinman (2010) in using changes in
credit score as a proxy for financial health, but note several caveats. First,
credit scores are only a proxy for financial health; it is likely that they only
imperfectly track the attributes of well-being that are important to the daily
life of borrowers. To be sure, they probably do correlate closely with access
to new credit, but access to new credit is not the same as financial health,
which should relate more closely to the ability to repay existing debt.
Importantly, as noted above, payday lenders ordinarily do not report
defaults to credit bureaus. Accordingly, any correlation between payday-loan
defaults and subsequent declines in credit scores is not caused directly by that
11
default, but should rest on other attributes of financial health. To be sure,
the analysis is complicated by the dynamic relation between the true variable
of interest (financial health) and credit scores. Most obviously, alteration of
a borrower’s financial position does not immediately shift the borrower’s
credit score; it takes time for the credit-reporting bureaus to receive the
information and incorporate it into their scores. Thus, adverse financial
events that precede (and perhaps cause) the borrower’s decision to borrow
from a payday lender can be reflected in a shift in the score after the date
of the loan rather than before.
A second problem arises from the particular data structure that is avail-
able. The data structure draws the credit score on the date of the first
qualifying loan of 2006, one year after that date, the first qualifying loan of
2008, and one year after that date. For borrowers who have qualifying loans
in both 2006 and 2008, that provides credit scores for each of four years.
Thus, for defaults during the period of the first credit score to the last, the
data provides credit scores one year apart, bracketing the date of default,
as well as scores bracketing two additional years either before or after the
default, as the case may be. For example, for 2006 defaults, the data pro-
vide scores that bracket the date of default (2006 and 2007) and each of the
two subsequent years (2007-2008 and 2008-2009); for 2009 defaults, the data
provide scores that bracket the date of default (2008 and 2009) and each of
two preceding years (2006-2007 and 2007-2008).
To the extent the goal is to identify the immediate consequence of default,
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the score at the end of the year in which the default occurs appears to be the
best available proxy. To be sure, for each observation some of the events that
cause the credit score to change during that year will have occurred before
the date of the payday loan default. But there is little reason to expect that
circumstance to systematically bias the estimates presented below.
Working from that framework, we can compare the difference between
a change in credit score during the year of default for those who defaulted
during that year to the change in credit score during that same year, for
those that did not default in that year.12 Thus, although the data are purely
observational, the “difference-in-difference” structure allows us to estimate
the relation between the default and the change in credit score during the
year of default. To enhance the robustness of the estimates, it also is useful
to control in the regressions for other variables that potentially might have
a systematic relation with those estimates. Buckley and Shang 2003.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 provides summary descriptive statistics for the variables used in the
analysis below. It suggests a population of borrowers slightly older than
average, with considerably lower income than the average. The borrowers,
on average, take out 2.1 loans during each year; 21.1% of all borrowers default
during each year; 1.9% of the loans end in default. The states included in the
12Following Allison (1990), I use change scores as a dependent variable rather than using
the scores at the beginning of the period as control variables.
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Variable Mean (Standard Deviation)
Age 40 (13)
Income 15,500 (17,800)
Loans/Year 2.1 (3.0)
Share of Defaulted Loans 1.9% (13.7%)
Share of Borrowers Defaulting/Year 21.1% (40.8%)
Table 1: Summary Descriptive Statistics. N=29,738-29,921 (borrower at-
tributes), 434,077 (share of defaulted loans). Source: Author. For loans/year
and share of borrowers defaulting/year, the table displays the mean (and
standard deviation) of the average of that attribute for each borrower for all
available years in the sample.
data employ a broad cross-section of different regulatory approaches. They
range from Texas (which has one of the most permissive regimes) to Florida
(which has one of the most restrictive regimes that permits payday lending
at all).
4.3 Assessing the Link Between Default and Subsequent
Credit Score
The most difficult problem in analyzing the effects of credit products is deter-
mining the appropriate “output” variable to assess the affect of a particular
event on the borrower’s overall financial health. As discussed above, this
dataset includes information about the borrower’s credit score over time,
which makes it practical to assess the differences in the course of financial
health, among payday loan borrowers, of those who do and do not default.
Compared to an average Vantage score of 736 (a “prime” level borrower), the
mean borrower’s score of 578 places the typical borrower squarely in the “F,
14
Credit Variables Credit Score Mean (Standard Deviation)
Credit Score 578 (48)
Delinquencies in Prior Year 73% (44%)
Table 2: Credit Variables. Source: Author. Table displays the mean (and
standard deviation) for all the credit score observations in each year.
High Risk” group, which roughly includes the bottom quintile by creditwor-
thiness of the population. The different ranges in the VantageScore system
are about 100 points in size. It is difficult to generalize (because less so-
phisticated lenders may truncate credit markedly at particular thresholds),
but generally speaking changes in credit score that shift a borrower through
a small part of one of those ranges should not materially affect access to
credit. Thus, changes of fifty or more points often might produce a notice-
able change but changes of ten to twenty points ordinarily would not.13 To
put the effects of the payday loan behavior in context, I also use (as an alter-
nate right-hand side variable) whether the borrower defaulted on any other
loan during the year in question. As Table 2 indicates, about 73% of the
payday-loan customers had a delinquency in any given year.
Turning to the data, the central question is whether the path of credit
scores during any particular time period shifts differently for defaulters than
it does for non-defaulters.14 At the aggregate level, there plainly is some
13The general information about credit score levels comes from informal communications
with Trans Union about the data and from the discussion of those scores by about.com,
at http://credit.about.com/od/vantagescore/a/vantage-score-overview.htm.
14To be sure, it would be easier to detect effects if the data structure were more robustly
longitudinal (like the data analyzed by Bhutta et al. (2014)). At the same time, because
their data structure requires matching to a census sample, it means that their dataset of
payday loan customers is much smaller than the data analyzed in this paper.
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difference: over the entire period the credit scores of those who defaulted
on a payday loan declined by a mean of 16 points, while the credit scores
of those who did not default declined by a mean of 11 points. To put it
another way, the difference between the beginning and ending scores for the
defaulters is five points larger than the difference between the beginning and
ending scores for the nondefaulters.
For several reasons, a more fine-grained analysis of the longitudinal aspect
of the data seemed appropriate. Specifically, because the hypothesis under
examination is that a default on a payday loan causes a subsequent decline
in financial health, it should be illuminating to put the default in a temporal
context - examining the relative shifts in credit scores before the year of
default, during the year of default, and in the years after default. Table 3
summarizes the data on that point.
As Table 3 indicates, the credit scores shift differently for defaulters than
they do for nondefaulters, but the differences are slight and the pattern of
shifts is not entirely consistent. In general, though, they tend to suggest
three things. First, they suggest that credit scores for defaulters already
have begun to drop during the year (or years) before the credit score drop;
the only significant change in that category is a drop ten points farther
during 2006 for those who would default in 2007 than for those who would
not default in 2007 (the “2007 Default” columns of the table). Second, they
suggest that the credit scores of defaulters decline more during the year of the
default than they do for nondefaulters, although the difference is quite slight
16
Reference Year 2006 Default 2007 Default 2008 DefaultYes No Yes No Yes No
Second Year Before n/a n/a n/a n/a (4.6) (4.7)
Year Before n/a n/a (15.4)** (5.5)** (9.3) (10.0)
Year of Default (17.6)** (7.3)** (19.1)** (3.6)** (10.9)** (0.3)**
Year After 1.6** (3.3)** 12.7** 5.0** n/a n/a
Second Year After 7.6** 5.7** n/a n/a n/a n/a
Table 3: Changes in Credit Scores, by Default Status and Year. For each
group, the Table displays the mean change (positive or negative) in credit
score during each period. * - 5% ** - 1%.
(10, 15, and 10 points during the three years). Finally, they suggest that the
credit scores of those who default rebound more sharply than the credit scores
of those who do not default. Specifically, for each of the three post-default
observations in the data, the credit scores of those who defaulted went up
by comparison to the credit scores of those who did not default during the
reference year. The differences are slight (5 points, 7 points, and 2 points),
and the number of years during which to observe changes is slight, but the
data at least suggest such a pattern.15
Given the relatively small difference in outcomes discernible from the raw
data, the question naturally arises whether the difference relates to some
systematic difference between the defaulters and the nondefaulters. Accord-
ingly, the next step is to regress the existence of a default on the explanatory
variables available in the dataset (age, income, and state of residence). As
15Further research might shed light on this phenomenon. It is possible, of course, that
a slight improvement reflects the receipt in time of distress of what has turned out to
be a loan that needs never to be repaid. That possibility resonates with the findings of
Demyanyk (2014), who concludes that the best explanation for credit-score increases after
a foreclosure is the borrower’s freedom from continuing mortgage payments.
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explained above, those regressions use a difference-in-difference approach,
estimating the difference between the credit-score differences for defaulters
and nondefaulters, with a view to quantifying the relation between a default
and a credit-score shift in a particular time period related to that default.
All of the regressions include state fixed effects and rely on robust standard
errors.16
Table 4 summarizes the results of that analysis. The principal model
(the first set of columns (“Aggregate”)) examines the data at the broadest
level: regressing the change in credit score over the entire period on the
existence of any default on a payday loan (the “P/D” column) or of some
other delinquency reported to the credit bureau (the “Other” column). As
with the bivariate analysis, it indicates a small but statistically significant
decline in credit score associated with the default on the payday loan. To
put that in context, the parallel overall decline in credit score associated with
any other delinquency is almost four times as large.
Because the bivariate data suggest the possibility that the aggregate re-
gressions conceal cognizable patterns in the years before and after the year
of default, the remaining columns of Table 4 present the results of separate
regressions for each of the years before or after the year of default. With some
caveats, that analysis buttresses three points from the less definitive analy-
sis summarized above. Most obviously, because of the size of the dataset,
16Alternate specifications used ZIP codes to account for geographical variation; they
did not differ significantly from the specifications summarized in the text. Table 5 in the
Appendix summarizes those results.
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the models readily identify as statistically significant shifts that are unlikely
to reflect a substantial shift in reality. Having said that, the data do sug-
gest a small, though statistically identifiable, drop in the year of default (as
compared to those who did not default in that year); taking account of age,
income, and the state in which the customer is located, the drop is a mere
14 points. Second, the data also suggest that the debtor’s problems have
not begun in the year of default, but rather years earlier - the data indicate
small (2 points and 6 points), but statistically significant drops in each of the
years before the year of default (as compared to those who did not default
in the base year). Third, the data confirm the idea that the credit scores of
defaulters rebound in subsequent years: in each of the two years after the
year of default, the credit scores of those who default perform significantly
better (2 points and 3 points better) than the credit scores of those who did
not default in that year. Recognizing that the minuscule size of the effects
makes any discussion of a long-run pattern speculative,17 is at the same time
particularly difficult to reconcile the results with the idea that a default on a
17Having said that, it is instructive that the pattern I observe is similar to the pattern
that Bhutta et al. (2014) observe in their more robustly longitudinal analysis of the effects
of payday borrowing (rather than default). Specifically, they observe that the customer’s
financial health has been declining steadily for several years before the first payday loan
and that it continues to improve steadily for several years after the date of the first payday
loan. That suggests, of course, that the use of payday loans is a response to the financial
distress rather than its cause. The combination of that pattern with the data analyzed
here suggests not only that the use of payday loans is largely trivial in the overall arc of the
consumer’s financial distress, but that the event of default is largely trivial in whatever
role payday lending plays in that arc. Demyanyk (2014) observes a similar pattern in
her analysis of mortgage foreclosures - the credit scores have declining for a considerable
period before the foreclosure and improve substantially after foreclosure.
20
payday loan is likely to tip a borrower over the edge into financial calamity.
On the contrary, if anything the access to credit of those who default on
payday loans seems likely to improve in the years that follow, not decline.
At least in part, this presumably reflects the rarity of reporting payday-loan
defaults to the mainstream credit bureaus; if the default is not reported to
those bureaus, then the default itself will not factor into the defaulter’s score
going forward.18
The parallel analysis of the effects of other types of delinquencies on a bor-
rower’s financial health is instructive. As with the payday lending data, the
data indicate a small, but statistically significant decline in the year of delin-
quency, preceded by a statistically significant decline during the preceding
years (as compared to those who were not delinquent during the base year),
and followed by two years of statistically significant increases (as compared
to those who were not delinquent during the base year).
5 Implications
This brief essay has a modest purpose, to consider the consequences of the
payday products’ relatively streamlined underwriting: are the defaults char-
acteristic of the product a dominant event in the financial distress of affected
borrowers? The findings presented above suggest that the default on a pay-
18I explored using other metrics of post-default creditworthiness (such as excessive bank-
card utilization), but found no relation between a payday loan default and those measures
of creditworthiness.
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day loan plays at most a small part in the overall timeline of the borrower’s
financial distress. Most obviously, it is plain that the effect of a default on
the borrower’s overall financial health is trivial at best - associated with a
trivial drop of 15 points or less (as compared to those who did not default).
Moreover, because of rebounds in credit scores in the years following the de-
fault, the regressions indicate that the “all-in” credit-score decline associated
with a default is considerably smaller, in the range of 5-7 points.
Although the data analyzed here provide no explanation for the small
size of the effect, they are consistent with the “too small to hurt” hypothesis
discussed above. Where a default on a mortgage loan can result in immedi-
ate financial catastrophe: loss of the equity in a house, as well as a risk of
a loss of residence entirely. By contrast, the immediate results of a default
on a payday loan are much less consequential. The lender’s effective means
of recourse are probably limited to collection calls and efforts to draft the
borrower’s account by means of ACH. If the borrower can withstand those
efforts, the principal long-term consequence is that the borrower gets to keep
the funds without repaying the loan. Because defaults to a payday lender are
reported to credit bureaus only rarely, they are unlikely to have any direct
effect on the consumer’s credit score or otherwise constrain other sources of
credit. Formal litigation is rarely cost-effective. Indeed, the most serious ad-
verse consequence is the loss of access to borrowing from the payday lender.
All in all, experienced borrowers familiar with those realities might undertake
“strategic” defaults to avoid protracted borrowing; the default immediately
22
terminates the costs associated with the protracted borrowing that has been
the center of so much of the attention to payday loans in recent years.19
Whatever the ultimate shape of that pattern, it is difficult to reconcile with
the idea that any substantial improvement to borrower welfare would come
from the imposition of an “ability-to-repay” requirement in payday loan un-
derwriting.
What is more interesting about the findings is how they situate the payday
loan default in the timeline of the borrower’s financial distress. The premise
of a regulatory regime that targets the payday loan as the central cause
of financial calamity is that borrowers are slipping along in circumstances
that are tight but manageable, but that the default on the payday loan tips
them over the edge into unmanageable impecunity. The data analyzed here,
albeit sketchy, undermine that vision in several ways. The first is that the
payday loan is plainly not the beginning of serious financial problems. As
summarized above, the credit scores of payday loan defaulters experience
disproportionate declines for at least two years before the payday default;
these data cannot discern the full timeline of the default because two years
is the longest “lookback” that they facilitate. In context, that finding places
the payday loan as a step to which the defaulters turn after years of steadily
increasing financial difficulty.20
Finally, the most interesting finding relates to the years after the payday
19For empirical examination of those costs, see Priestley 2014.
20As mentioned above, Bhutta et al. (2014) provides strong support for that perspective.
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loan default. As summarized above, the data analyzed here indicate that
payday loan defaulters (as compared to other payday loan customers) expe-
rience an disproportionately large rise in their credit scores for at least two
years following the year of default, evidence suggesting some cognizable re-
bound in the financial health of the post-default borrowers, and considerably
mitigating the decline associated with the initial default.
Much more work is necessary to untangle the full timeline of consumer
financial distress. It would be particularly useful for later researchers to
explore other measures of financial health to gauge the reliability of credit
scores as a proxy for the underlying reality. But the findings summarized
above do help to fill in one small part of the picture by situating the payday
loan default in its place in that timeline. It is at most a single step in a
protracted experience, and by no means a particularly important one.
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